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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In recent years terrorism has become a household word.  The first bombing of the World 
Trade Center in 1993 by foreign terrorists shocked the world and proved the United 
States was indeed vulnerable. In 1995, the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City brought the realization that terrorism existed on a domestic level.   In 
2001, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked by foreign terrorists flying 
highjacked planes and brought terrorism to a personal level in the minds of all 
Americans.  The subsequent disbursement of a laboratory strain of anthrax spores via the 
United States Mail caused panic and social disruption.  While terrorism has crossed all 
geographical, ethnic, and social barriers, it is the water, food supply, people, and the 
infrastructure of the United States that has proven to be vulnerable. At the present time 
terrorism may be either foreign or domestic and may take the form of nuclear, chemical, 
or biological assaults. 
 
Neither public health issues nor biological warfare involving anthrax are new.  
Historically, “the plague of boils”, one of the seven plagues of Egypt, is suspected to 
have been anthrax (Bacillus anthracis and Anthrax).  In the 1600’s, Black Bain (anthrax) 
is believed to have caused the death of 60,000 cattle in Europe (Timeline, 2001). A 
human case of anthrax was reported in Kentucky in the early 1800’s. This case of 
cutaneous anthrax was subsequently found to be contracted by contact with infected
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livestock (Todar, 2001).  The disease became known as “Woolsorter’s disease” because it 
affects people involved in the sheep industry. In 1876, Robert Koch isolated and 
identified Bacillus anthracis as the bacterial agent responsible for anthrax (Oxford 
University Press, Inc., 1998). In 1881, Pasteur developed the first immunization for 
livestock against anthrax.  
 
In World War II, after having had success with chemical warfare (i.e. mustard gas) 
programs during World War I, Nazi Germany established programs using anthrax as a 
biological weapon (Milestones in Anthrax History, n.d.).   German agents infected the 
horses, mules, and cattle used by the allied forces with anthrax.  In 1937, Japan began a 
biological warfare program in Manchuria which included testing human subjects with 
anthrax (Dixon et al.,1999).  During the Manchurian campaign, Japan performed 
extensive testing of anthrax as a bioweapon.  It is estimated that by 1940, over 5 tons of 
anthrax had been manufactured for placement in bombshell casings (Albarelli, 2001).    
Extensive testing on casing types led to the development of a porcelain anthrax bomb that 
shattered on impact.   
 
 By 1942, the United Kingdom’s biological warfare program included experimentation 
off the coast of Scotland on Gruinard’s Island, which has only recently been 
decontaminated (Bhalla & Warheit, 2004). The United States Army began considering 
anthrax as a biological warfare agent in 1942 (Albarelli, 2001). This project was a joint 
effort with the Canadian military and produced 150 pounds of anthrax spore per month.  
The United States military converted a conventional munitions plant into a bioweapon 
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production facility in Vigo, Indiana. This plant would produce enough anthrax for 
500,000 bombs in less than a month.  The facility produced one million anthrax bombs, 
half of which were stockpiled in the United States.  Believing that the Japanese were 
using hot air balloons as a transport for porcelain encased anthrax, Fort Detrick, 
Maryland placed bacteriologists on high alert in 1944 when large balloon sightings 
inscribed with Japanese writing were reported.  The U.S. biological warfare program 
continued after World War II at Fort Detrick. In the late 1950’s the military began 
clinical trials on humans for an anthrax vaccine.  In 1969, President Nixon ended the 
biological weapons program, however, biological warfare defense programs continue 
today (Johnson, n.d.). In 1970, the FDA approved the anthrax vaccine (Gardner, 2004).  
 
 In 1972, international concerns of biological weapons resulted in outlawing the 
development and stockpiling of these weapons. In the late 1970’s, a human anthrax 
epidemic broke out in Zimbabwe infecting 10,738 victims (Nass, 1992). The Soviet 
Union’s biological weapons program continued in deference to the international bans. A 
military facility in Sverdlvosk accidentally released aerosolized anthrax spores in 1979 
(Abramova et al., 1993). This well documented incident resulted in 64 deaths at a nearby 
community. The incident provided the opportunity for case studies of anthrax exposure 
for short term and long-term effects.  Concerns of anthrax use as a biological weapon led 
to the vaccination of U.S. troops in 1991 as preparation for the Gulf War (Todar, 2001).  
 
Anthrax has been used as a terrorist weapon since the early 1990’s.  In 1993, Aum 
Shinrikyo, a terrorist group, released anthrax from a mid-rise Tokyo office building 
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laboratory; no one was injured by this incident (Guillemin, 1999). By 1995, Iraq had 
produced 8,500 liters of concentrated anthrax (Todar, 2001). In 1997, the treatment of 
choice for anthrax was penicillin G (Penn & Koltz, 1977). The possibility of a penicillin 
resistant strain of anthrax being used as a bioweapon has led to a preferred treatment of 
dual antibiotics consisting of ciprofloxacin and doxycycline.  In 1998 the Secretary of 
Defense, realizing the anthrax threat, approved anthrax vaccination for all military 
service members.     
 
In 2001, subsequent to the World Trade Center bombing, anthrax spores were used by 
terrorists. These spores were distributed though the U.S. postal service.  This attack 
resulted in 22 cases of anthrax with 4 deaths (Sanderson et al., 2004). The 2001 anthrax 
outbreak has been traced to B. anthracis strain 135.  These isolates were confirmed and 
subtyped utilizing procedures described by Keim et al. (2000). During the 2001 outbreak, 
Florida postal workers at risk of exposure were offered prophylactic antibiotics 
(Quintiliani, R. Jr. & Quintiliani R., 2003). 
 
The anthrax exposure via the U.S. mail has sparked renewed interest in anthrax research. 
The primary difficulty for treating anthrax is diagnosis. The United States Army 
categorizes agents for biological warfare into three groups (Kahn et al., 2000). Category 
A is designated for high priority agents.  These agents are easily disseminated causing a 
high mortality rate.  The effect of public panic and social disruption is critical and would 
require special and immediate action for public health preparedness.  Category A agents 
includes smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, and Ebola.   Category B agents are the 
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second highest priority agents and are moderately easy to disseminate.  These agents 
cause moderate morbidity with low mortality.  Category B agents include Q-fever, 
brucellosis, ricin toxin and staphylococcus enterotoxin B.  Food and water pathogens 
such as Salmonella, Shigella, and E. coli are also considered Category B agents.   
Category C is designated for emerging pathogens with engineering potential in future 
use.  These agents are characterized by availability, ease of production, and potential 
major health impact.  Category C agents include hantavirus, yellow fever, tick-borne 
hemorrhagic-fever, and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis.  Category C agents require 
further research including detection, treatment, and prevention.  
 
Anthrax is suitable as a biological weapon.  B. anthracis is the etiological agent of 
anthrax.  Classified as a Category A agent, this spore forming gram positive rod is 
capable of causing a large number of deaths rapidly which would lead to social disruption 
(Lane et al., 2001). In order to be effective, bioweapons need to be inexpensive and easily 
produced (McGovern & Christopher, n.d.). Bioweapons have the added characteristic of 
being selective. These weapons can be developed to target humans, animals, or plants.   
 
The primary disadvantage of using bioagents as weapons is the hazard to the user and the 
dependence on weather conditions.  Bioagents with a short incubation period are more 
effective in a tactical setting.  The bioagent would prevent a battle unit from carrying out 
its mission and subsequently overwhelm the medical and evacuation process (Goodman, 
2004). Bioagents with a longer incubation period have more appeal to terrorist as they 
would cause social disruption. The World Health Organization estimates that 50kg of 
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anthrax spores released upwind in an urban area could result in a 20% fatality rate with 
an additional 25% requiring hospitalization (Reshetin & Regens, 2003).  
 
The incident in Sverdlvosk provided an opportunity for studies on the effectiveness of 
anthrax as a bioweapon.  Extensive studies of the location of victims relative to the 
source site have been preformed (Meselson et al., 1994). The total weight of spores 
accidentally released is estimated to be between 5mg to 1000mg.  This small quantity 
caused 64 fatalities and 32 non-fatal causalities. This example clearly demonstrates the 
effectiveness of anthrax as a bioweapon. 
 
B. anthracis can produce a fatal bacterial infection when the microorganism enters the 
body by cutaneous, ingestion, or inhalation means/mode. Generally, anthrax is a disease 
of domesticated herbivorous animals such as cattle, sheep, horses, mules, and goats 
(Baillei, 2001). Most human infections are a result of contact with contaminated animals 
or animal products.  Woolsorter’s Disease is an example of inhalation infection by spore-
contaminated dust when animal hairs or hides are handled (Todar, 2001). Human-to-
human cases of anthrax have not been documented.  Cutaneous anthrax infection presents 
as a nondescript, painless, pruritic papule 3 to 5 days after exposure. These lesions 
quickly form a necrotic vesicle leaving a characteristic black eschar or scab surrounded 
by edema (Dixon et al., 1999). Gastrointestinal anthrax occurs by ingestion of either 
vegetative microorganisms or spores through a pre-existing GI lesion.  The affected 
tissues show massive edema and mucosal necrosis. The peritoneal fluid may reveal 
numerous large gram-positive bacilli (Nalin et al., 1977). Inhalation anthrax is usually 
 7 
associated with a pre-existing pulmonary disease or other medical compromises such as 
leukemia or diabetes.   
 
Both the vegetative form and spore form of the microorganism can produce disease.  The 
vegetative form of the microorganism is susceptible to a wide range of antibiotics 
because it does not localize in the lung similar to other “true pneumonias”.  However, 
there is difficulty in getting antibiotics to the microorganism (Penn & Koltz, 1977). The 
endospores of B. anthracis are the infectious particles of anthrax.   Since anthrax is a 
spore former, killing the vegetative phase does not inactivate the spores.  Spores are 
inhaled and deposited in the terminal alveoli where they are engulfed by macrophages 
and carried to the lymph nodes, germinating en route.  The organism produces necrosis in 
the lymph nodes which allows for vascular dissemination and multi-organ failure, often 
resulting in death (Abramova et al., 1993).  
 
Endospores are the dormant life stage produced by the genus Bacillus.  The endospore is 
not the reproductive structure but rather a survival mechanism.  These endospores are 
resistant to extreme conditions such as high temperatures, most disinfectants, and low 
energy radiation (The Prokaryotic Cell, 2004). B. anthracis spores are ellipsoidal, located 
centrally or terminally, and do not swell the sporangium (Turnball, n.d.). There are five 
distinct waves of gene expression as the B. anthracis cells proceed from exponential 
growth through sporulation. Many of the gene components responsible for the assembly 
and maturation of the spore are expressed from the exponential growth phase through 
sporulation (Lie et al., 2004). It is notable that this gene expression occurs even before 
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sporulation. Gene expression during sporulation is mainly related to the physical 
construction of the spore rather than the synthesis of the potential spore content.   
 
The first anthrax vaccination for animal use was developed in 1881 by Louis Pasteur for 
animal use.  Human vaccines were not developed until the middle of the 20th century 
(Baillei, 2001). Classic vaccines use non-living subunits based on protective antigens. 
Vaccination is the most cost effective form of protection. Medical professionals do not 
recommend the anthrax vaccine for general use by the public.  Additional studies are 
needed to determine safety and efficacy of the vaccine in children, the elderly and 
immunocompromised individuals.  The current anthrax vaccine, while effective, requires 
six shots over an 18 month period with an additional annual booster (Bioterrorism Week, 
2004). This vaccine has shown to cause some side effects.  
 
Research on alternative vaccines is in clinical trial stages.  The immune responses to 
anthrax in non-human primates involve a Protective Antigen (PA).  Anti-PA antibodies 
are currently being considered in anthrax studies for developing new vaccines (Anthrax, 
2002). A vaccine based on a human monoclonal antibody to the B. anthracis protective 
antigen (ABthrax) is being developed by Human Genome Sciences, Inc. (Bioterrorism 
Week, 2004).  The phase I clinical trial results have been presented with only occasional 
mild adverse side effects.  Pharmacokinetic analysis shows a half-life of approximately 
three weeks.  This vaccine does not disrupt the host derived anti-PA antibody production.  
Antibodies against Anthrax can provide a significant survival benefit without interfering 
with an individual’s protective immune response.  Early phase II results indicate 
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continued complete protection against anthrax for up to one year.  The U.S. government 
has plans to stockpile anthrax vaccines.  These long-range plans also include 
experimental vaccines that show promise.  The National Institute of Health backs this 
plan even though many of the new vaccines are in the early stages of study. The constant 
threat of terrorism has forced this unconventional plan.  The time frame required to 
produce and stockpile sufficient inoculum for twenty-five million people does not allow 
the government to wait for the clinical trial results (Bioterrorism Week, 2004).  
 
Two plasmids are linked to the virulence of B. anthracis, pXO1 and pX02.  The pX01 
plasmid encodes for three toxin factors: the protective antigen, the lethal factor, and the 
edema factor (Bhatnagar & Batra, 2001). These three toxin factors are necessary to 
produce two exotoxins.  The pX02 plasmid encodes a poly D-glutamic acid capsule.  This 
capsule enables the bacterium to withstand phagocytosis (Jensen et al., 2003). When the 
pX02 plasmid is not expressed, the cell is incapable of establishing an infection. The 
Sterne anthrax vaccine is based on the bacterium becoming attenuated in this matter 
(Okinaka et al., 1999).  
 
There is a strong genetic similarity between B. anthracis and other Bacillus species. 
Analysis of 16S rRNA sequences indicates a greater than 99% sequence similarity 
(Pepper & Gentry, 2002). Variable-number tandem repeat (VNTR) studies comparing B. 
cereus and B. anthracis show an exact match.  This genetic analysis has led some 
researchers to believe that B. anthracis and B. cereus may be one species (Helgason et 
al., 2000). The conserved core genes between B. anthracis and B. cereus include factors 
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for invasion, establishment, and propagation of bacteria within the host (Ivanova, 2003).  
Both species have homologous mechanisms for protection against the host defense 
system.  Pathogenicity-related genes are present in B. anthracis and B. cereus.    
 
The evolution of B. anthracis and B. cereus from a common ancestor is linked to the 
acquisition of key plasmid-encoded toxin, capsule, and regulatory loci. This lethal toxin 
locus is located on pX01.  The atxA regulatory gene controls toxin gene expression in B. 
anthracis.  The chromosomal regulator plcR in B. cereus is incompatible with the atxA 
regulatory gene, thus inhibiting the lethal toxin expression (Read et al.). Additional 
genetics studies of B. anthracis and B. cereus show a commonality in the components of 
the exposporium. Eight genes encode structural components for the exosporium with 
more similarity between B. anthracis and B. cereus than other Bacillus species (Todd et 
al., 2003). In a study of the genomic sequences of ten non-anthrax-causing Bacillus 
species; there was a high likelihood of false-positives for DNA-based identification 
assays on chromosomal loci (Radnedge et al., 2003).   
 
 The increased incidents of bioterrorism caused the United States to develop a separate 
governmental department known as the Department of Homeland Security.  This 
department regulates and oversees potential biological events.  Currently B. anthracis is 
one of those agents being closely monitored by this department. All known cultures of B. 
anthracis are documented for reference.  The commonality within the species allows for 
the study of B. anthracis through the use of the surrogate B. cereus.  This study utilized 
B. cereus as a model for addressing issues of a bioterrorism agent.   
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B. cereus belongs to the group Bacillus cereus sensu lato, a gram-positive, rod-shaped, 
aerobic, spore-forming bacteria and is a soil-dwelling opportunistic pathogen (Rasko et 
al., 2004). B. cereus is associated with non-fatal cases of food poisoning as a result of two 
exotoxins, an emetic and a diarrheal (Opstal et al., 2004). The microorganism has also 
been linked to endophthalmitis (after eye trauma), periodontal disease, and fatal cases of 
pneumonia.   
 
The life cycle for Bacillus species encompasses five stages: lag phase, exponential phase 
(cells in short chains with high motility, pH drops), stationary phase (cells form 
aggregates, pH increases, lactic acid metabolizes), early sporulation phase (gray spores 
formed), spore formation state (bright spores rapidly increase, aggregates of cells 
disassociates, cells lyse, spores released) (De Vries et al., 2004).  The spores are resistant 
to heat, cold, radiation, desiccation, and disinfectants.  The bacteria are ubiquitous with a 
wide distribution in soil, dust, and air (Zhang R. & Zhang C., 2003).  It is commonly 
found in food products such as dairy items, rice, spices, vegetables, meats, and infant 
products (Faille et al., 2002).  
 
The spores of Bacillus species persist for long periods of time.  Forty years after the 
Gruinard’s Island biological warfare test, viable B. anthracis spores were isolated 
(Manchee et al., 1982). The recovered spores represent only a small fraction of those 
deposited on the island. In a Norwegian study of soil isolates, genetic diversity is seen 
among strains of B. cereus.  These samples were collected in a small geographic area yet 
displayed a high degree of genetic variation which is attributed to the highly polymorphic 
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characteristic of the species. The B. anthracis strain showed little variation reflecting its 
monomorhpic characteristic (Ticknor et al., 2001).   
 
B. cereus possesses characteristics that make it easy to isolate and identify.  The organism 
appears in chains.  It is motile and has a distinct hemolytic pattern when grown on 
reduced blood agar.  It is a producer of lecithinase and is penicillin-resistant.  The gram-
positive spores readily stain with Malachite green.  These spores are ellipsoidal, central to 
subterminal, and do not swell the sporangium (Oxford University, 1998). The bacteria 
has a short generation time (20-30 minutes) and with heat shock, converts to spore form.  
On blood agar, B. cereus produces a zone on non-hemolysis surrounded by a zone of 
complete hemolysis (Beecher & Wong, 2000). (Figure1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. B. cereus colonies on SBA  
demonstrating various forms  
of hemolysis.  
 
 
The use of Mannitol-egg yolk-polymyxin (MYP) allows for further identification of B. 
cereus.  The egg yolk in the media provides lecithin for the B. cereus to hydrolyze 
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forming a precipitate on the media. B. cereus colonies are surrounded by precipitates 
which indicate lecithinase production. (Figure 2).   
 
 
 
Figure 2. B. cereus colonies on MYP  
agar demonstrating various 
degrees and types of  
lecithinase production.  
 
 
 The polymyxin will inhibit the growth of most other bacteria (Jensen et al., 2003). The 
distinguishing characteristic of B. anthracis and B. cereus are compared in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of B. anthracis and B. cereus on Blood Agar. 
 
Characteristics B. anthracis B. cereus 
Motility Negative Positive 
Hemolysis Negative Positive 
Lysis by Gamma Phage Positive Negative 
Penicillin Susceptibility Positive Negative 
Crystalline Parasporal Inclusion Negative Negative 
Growth on 7% NaCl Positive Positive 
Tyrosine Decomposition Negative Positive 
 
 
*B. anthracis colonies will appear grey-white/white in color and are generally smaller. 
*B. cereus colonies will have a green tinge appearance and are generally larger. 
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Finally, Interstate Highway-35 (I-35), the North-South highway that divides the state of 
Oklahoma, is considered to be one of the ecological dividing lines of the United States 
(Guided Spatial Analysis, n.d.). East of I-35, the environment is that of the Mississippi 
River Valley and West of I-35 is considered lower sonora.  This rather abrupt change of 
the environment has an impact on the variety of microorganisms found in the soil. For 
example, Histoplasma capsulatum is known to thrive east of I-35, but will not grow west 
of I-35.  This microbial diversity is thought to be related to the soil acidity and moisture 
content. 
 
 
Research Questions 
1. Is B. cereus easily found in soil? 
2. What effect does the ecological dividing line have on ubiquity?  
2. Can B. cereus be easily grown and made to sporulate? 
3. Can the spore be transmitted by foodstuff (coffee), intimate contact 
(toothbrushes), and casual contact (doorknobs)? 
The following research protocols were employed to answer these questions. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The materials used in these protocols and their sources are listed in the appendix A.  
A. ENVIRONMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 
1.  SPECIMEN COLLECTION 
In order to answer the question regarding the presence of B. cereus in the environment 
while addressing the question of the ecological dividing line (I-35), microbial specimens 
were obtained at 5-mile intervals from west of Enid, Oklahoma to just west of Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. (~50 miles on either sides of I-35)  (Figure 3).    Three soil specimens were 
taken from each site at ~25 foot increments. Samples were collected from 32 locations 
resulting in 96 total specimens.  Mile markers were used as a reference for the sample 
sites.  Aseptic techniques were utilized by dipping a standard bulb planter into a 
container of alcohol and flaming, the bulb planter was used to take the top one inch of 
the soil.  The soil samples were placed in sterile Petri dishes, marked for identification, 
and sealed with tape.  The specimens were transported to the OSU-CHS Infectious 
Diseases laboratory and allowed to dry at room temperature.   
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Figure 3. Map of Soil Collection 
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2. PASTEURIZATION  
Prior to use, soil samples were pasteurized to determine the optimum temperature that 
inhibits other microorganisms without inhibiting Bacillus cereus growth.  Two samples 
of B. cereus with known profiles from previous studies, a sample of Staphylococcus 
aureus ATCC 25923, and a sample of Escherichia coli ATCC 25922 were used.  The 
specimens were placed in a flask of Brain Heart Infusion (BHI) broth and incubated 
overnight.  The cultures were then subjected to a water bath for 10 minute increments at 
temperatures ranging from 30°C to 100ºC.  After treatment at each temperature level, a 
sample of the solution was plated to Sheep Blood Agar (SBA). 
  
3. SOIL CULTURES  
One gram of each soil specimen was mixed with 3 ml of BHI broth and subjected to 
pasteurization at 70°C for 10 minutes.  Microbial specimens that survived pasteurization 
were classified as spore formers.  “Spore formers” were plated to SBA and MYP plates.  
Gross colonial morphology was used to select colonies for pure cultures.  Distinguishing 
characteristics of motility, hemolysis, and penicillin susceptibility were identifying 
factors for B. cereus. (Manual of Clinical Biology, Sixth Edition). Specimens that were 
plated to SBA were also subjected to 10,000-units /ml penicillin test discs.  Specimens 
inoculated on MYP were distinguished by catalase production, mannitol reaction, and 
lipase production.  Specimens demonstrating the standardized characteristics were 
chosen for gram stain.  Gram stain reactions showing a positive stain and spores that 
were ellipsoidal, spherical, central, paracentral and did not swell the sporangium were 
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considered diagnostic of Bacillus cereus.  These specimens were frozen in BHI broth 
with glycerol for future use.   
 
4. HEAT RESISTANCE OF B. CEREUS SPORES 
In order to produce an adequate supply of spores for transmission studies, the B. cereus 
strains are heat treated to eliminate extraneous microbes.  Test of 17 strains of Bacillus 
cereus were used.    In four soil samples (5A, 18A, 27A, and 30A), B. cereus spores 
survived a heat shock treatment of 80ºC for 10 minutes. These  four spore strains, ten B. 
cereus spore specimens  with known heat shock  profiles ( SF-3, SF-19, PF-5, SF-20, 
LR-15, GF-6, PF-16A, FMP-44, LR-16, and SF-10), and three commercial stocks of B. 
cereus (ATCC 13061, ATCC 14579, and ATCC 11778) were used to produce killing 
curves to select the most heat resistant spore.  Spore specimens were subject to heat 
shock from 30°C to 90ºC for 10 minutes.  Serial dilutions were prepared, plated to BHI 
agar, incubated overnight at 37ºC and a colony count performed.    
   
5.  SPORE PREPARATION 
Based on the serial dilutions and the results of the heat shock study, two B. cereus spore 
specimens were chosen: Arnold 5A, a strong toxin producing strain and Whimpy SF-19, 
a weak toxin producing strain.  The specimens were placed in a sporulation media and 
incubated over the weekend at 37°C.  The spore solutions were centrifuged at 12000 
RPM for 10 minutes at 4ºC in a Beckman Avanti J-25.  The Arnold and Whimpy spore 
pellets were then freeze dried in a lyophilizer.  The spore pellets were weighed and 
frozen until used. Eight serial 10-fold dilutions were performed with 1/100 of each 
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dilution plated to BHI agar plates and incubated overnight at 37°C; colony forming units 
(CFU) were counted. Calculations of CFU’s determined the amount of spores to be used. 
Aliquots of Arnold and Whimpy were each resuspended in sterile water and placed into 
a 70ml spray bottle for contamination transmission purposes.   
 
B. CONTAMINATION TRANSMISSION STUDIES 
Three contamination transmission studies were conducted.  One study used coffee, to 
mimic ingestion transmission. Another study used toothbrushes to evaluate intimate 
ingestion transmission. The final studies used sterile doorknobs to simulate contact or 
casual transmission.   All studies involved the spore form of the two previously 
discussed strains of B. cereus. 
 
1.  INGESTION TRANSMISSION: COFFEE   
Coffee was used to demonstrate transmission through foodstuff. Because of the time 
lapse between contamination and end results, it would be considered an untraceable 
source. Approximately 12mg of Arnold (5A) spores and 12mg of Whimpy (SF-19) 
spores were mixed with 25 grams of coffee grounds separately.  Coffee was brewed 
using these grounds in an automatic brewing coffee pot using sterile water. After 
brewing, 5 cups of coffee were prepared as follows: coffee only, coffee with Sweet-n-
Low, coffee with sugar, coffee with Coffee-Mate French Vanilla/International Delight 
French Vanilla creamer (liquids) for Arnold, and  Cain’s Coffee Creamer (powder) and 
Lando’Lakes half and half (liquid) for Whimpy. The cups of coffee were allowed to sit 
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for 20 minutes.  Serial dilutions were performed and inoculation on BHI Agar plates. 
The BHI Agar plates were incubated overnight at 37°C and the data recorded. 
 
2. INTIMATE TRANSMISSION: TOOTHBRUSH 
Sterile toothbrushes were used to demonstrate ingestion transmission through personal 
intimate objects. Spores were resuspended in sterile water and distributed via a spray 
bottle. Three sets of ethylene oxide sterilized toothbrushes were utilized in this 
experiment.  The first set was sprayed with sterile water. The second set was sprayed 
with the spore solution. The third set was sprayed with spore solution, incubated, and 
then dipped in a liquid suspension of toothpaste and sterile water to simulate brushing. 
At 0 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, each toothbrush was brushed in an X pattern onto a 
SBA plate. The 24 hour and 48 hour toothbrushes were placed in a vented hood and were 
undisturbed during the allotted time period. The SBA plates were incubated overnight at 
37ºC and the data recorded.  
 
3. CONTACT OR CASUAL TRANSMISSION: DOORKNOB 
Doorknobs were used to demonstrate transmission through casual contacts.  The 
doorknobs were sterilized using ethylene oxide.  Two sets of sterile doorknobs of 
varying materials (glass, brushed metal and brass-plated) were mounted double sided to 
a wooden platform to simulate a door frame. The wooden platform with its porous nature 
was covered in vinyl contact paper to facilitate cleaning. Controls were constructed by 
spraying SBA plates with the sterile water and the spore solution.  The spore solution 
was sprayed onto each doorknob at a precise distance (6”) to maintain uniformity.   The 
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doorknobs were allowed to dry for 15 minutes and touched to SBA plates for a baseline 
determination.  The doorknobs were thoroughly cleaned with an alcohol solution and 
resprayed with the spore suspension and allowed to dry. Each doorknob was touched to a 
SBA plate after a 24 hour period.  The process was repeated again after a 48 hour time 
period.  The SBA plates were incubated overnight at 37ºC and the data recorded. During 
each experiment, the doorknobs were kept in a vented hood and allowed to dry 
undisturbed for the allotted time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
CHAPTER III 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
A.  ENVIRONMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 
1. SPECIMEN COLLECTION 
The soil sample collection was performed on October 28, 2004.  The weather condition 
was overcast with periodic light precipitation.  The preceding days’ weather was 
moderate rainfall, typical of Oklahoma fall weather.  These conditions resulted in soil 
samples, which were moist to varying degrees. The data is summarized in Table 2. 
 
Sample sites varied in soil texture and consistency.  No single site presented unusual or 
notable characteristics (i.e. large population of insects or visible parasites).  Sample sites 
varied in terrain types from bordering croplands and wooded areas to bordering salt flats.  
The path of sample collection included a sampling from a medium-sized town.  (Enid) 
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Table 2. Soil Sample Collection. 
 
Three samples taken at each site~10 feet increments at 45 degree angles.  Samples 
labeled A, B, and C.  Total of 96 samples. 
 
 
 
Soil Sample Collection 
28-Oct-04 
Fairview, OK to Prue Exit, west to east 
Weather conditions - overcast and rain 
Dina Miller, Dr. Glass, Dr. Conrad, Jay Bullard 
     
Site Mileage Mile Marker Time Photo # 
1 71688  12:22 222,221,220 
2 71693  12:26 219 
3 71697  12:45 218 
4 71702  12:56 217 
5 71707  1:09 216 
6 71712  1:18 215 
7 71717  1:28 214,213 
8 71722  1:39 212 
9 71727 1 mile west of feed lot 1:50 211 
10 71732 West side of Enid 2:03 210 
11 71737 East side of Enid 2:24 209 
12 71742   209 
13 71747   208 
14 71752   207 
15 72757 10 miles west of I-35  206 
16 71762  3:25 205 
17 71767 West of I-35  204 
18 71767 East of I-35  203 
19 71772 5  203 
20 71777 10  202 
21 71782 15 4:20 201 
22 71787 20 4:35 200 
23 71792 25, rest area  198.199 
24 71797 30  197 
25 71802 35 5:00 195 
26 71807 40  194 
27 71812 45 5:29 193 
28 71817 50  192 
29 71822 55  190,191 
30 71827 entrance to East 64  187,188,189 
31 71833   186 
32 71837 Prue Exit  185 
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The weather conditions required the soil samples to be dried upon returning to the OSU-
CHS laboratory.  The petri dishes of soil were vented to facilitate the drying process.  
Visual inspection of the soil samples determined that the soil types range from red clay 
to dark enriched soil.   Some samples contained small amounts of decaying vegetative 
matter.   Most sites presented consistent composition. The soil sample from site 19 
presented the largest color range from light red clay to dark brown soil.   Sample site 26 
presented a gray pigment in the soil.  Sample C from site 30 appeared black in color, 
which may be attributed to products from the roadway. Soil sites and soil sample 
specimens are demonstrated in Appendix C.  
 
The midpoint of the path of the soil sample collection crossed the ecological dividing 
line (I-35).  This ecological dividing line separates the temperate eastern United States 
from the arid western United States.  This broad generalization separates areas relative to 
agricultural factors.  The ubiquity of B. cereus was found to cross this divide.   
 
2. PASTEURIZATION  
An initial culturing of sample 8C was performed by sprinkling a small amount of soil 
sample directly to a BHI agar plate.  This culture had diverse growth of multiple types of 
bacteria that were too numerous to count (TNTC).  Prior to testing for B. cereus, 
pasteurization of the soil specimens was performed to eliminate extraneous 
microorganisms.  Known strains of B. cereus were tested in conjunction with S. aureus 
and E. coli, common non-spore forming bacteria. The results of temperature sensitivity 
for the three microorganisms are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3.  Pasteurization Test of Microorganisms 
              
            
        
 
 
 
 
*TNTC – Too Numerous To Count, NG – No Growth 
 
Cultures grown from samples heated at 50°C and below showed numerous colonies.  
These colonies were normal in appearance, size, and color.  At 60°C, the B. cereus 
colonies were TNTC and showed normal morphology.  While the growth of S. aureus 
and E. coli colonies was reduced and the colony morphology appeared irregular and 
degraded.  At 70°C no growth was observed on the S. aureus and E. coli cultures and 
reduced growth was observed with B. cereus.  Minimal growth was seen with B. cereus 
at 80°C with no growth in the S. aureus and E. coli cultures.  At 70°C and 80°C the B. 
cereus colonies appeared healthy with normal morphology.  Growth at 80°C is indicative 
of spore formation.  From this data, 70°C was selected for the ideal pasteurization 
temperature. When pasteurization at temperatures was greater than 80°C, no growth was 
seen. The optimum pasteurization with the preservation of B. cereus was 70°C for 10 
minutes. 
Pasteurization Test of Microorganisms 
 B. cereus S. aureus E. coli 
Room Temp/ 0 minutes TNTC TNTC TNTC 
Room Temp/10 minutes TNTC TNTC TNTC 
30ºC/10 minutes TNTC TNTC TNTC 
40ºC/10minutes TNTC TNTC TNTC 
50ºC 10 minutes TNTC TNTC TNTC 
60ºC/10 minutes TNTC TNTC TNTC 
70ºC/10 minutes ~18 colonies NG NG 
80ºC/10 minutes 3 colonies NG NG 
90ºC/10 minutes NG NG NG 
100ºC/10 minutes NG NG NG 
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3.  SOIL CULTURES 
All soil samples were pasteurized (70°C for 10 minutes) to inhibit growth of non-spore 
forming bacteria. The soil samples were tested for the presence of B. cereus spore. Some 
soil samples may have contained other spore forming microbes. However, only cultures 
that presented typical with B. cereus characteristics were subsequently evaluated.  The 
results are summarized in Table 4.  
 
Gross colony morphology was used as the initial criteria to select colonies for further 
identification.  Subsequent identification was based on motility, hemolysis, and 
penicillin susceptibility. Colony and sub-colony morphology for sites A, B, and C 
isolates are summarized in the appendix B.    On this basis, 65 of the 96 soil samples 
tested positive for B. cereus; 27 of the soil samples tested negative for the presence of B. 
cereus.  Four soil samples showed no growth of B. cereus, however these four samples 
did show growth of spore forming bacteria.  These colonies demonstrated indeterminate 
levels within the identification criteria.  The ambiguity of these samples could not be 
defined as a negative and are therefore classified as no data. The results are summarized 
in Table 4. The distinction between sites A, B, and C were arbitrary.  Site C was located 
closest to the pavement of the roadway.  Sites A and B were equidistant from the 
roadway. (Approximately 25 feet from the pavement edge, approximately 25 feet apart) 
Each sample site is independent and not mutually exclusive. The sampling sites were 
approximately 5 miles apart.  The negative sites located 25 feet from a positive soil site 
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would seem improbable.  It is pertinent to note the presence of B. cereus was 
independent of the ecological dividing line. The mean probability of obtaining B. cereus 
spores from a site is 0.705 (70.5%). The results are summarized in Table 5.  
 
Table 4.  Detection of B. cereus in Soil Sample Collections. 
   *(+) – Positive for B. cereus, (-) – Negative for B. cereus, No data – no growth 
 
Table 5. Probability of B. cereus in Soil Samples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detection of B. cereus in Soil Sample Collections 
West of Highway I-35 East of Highway I-35 
S a m p l e  S i t e  Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample Site Sample A Sample B Sample C 
1 + + + 18 + + + 
2 + - + 19 - + - 
3 No data No data + 20 + + + 
4 - - - 21 + - + 
5 + + - 22 - + + 
6 + - - 23 + + + 
7 No data + + 24 - + + 
8 - - - 25 - + + 
9 + - + 26 - + + 
10 + + + 27 - + - 
11 + - - 28 No data + + 
12 + + - 29 + + - 
13 + - + 30 + + + 
14 + + + 31 + + + 
15 + + + 32 + + + 
16 - + +     
17 - + +     
Total (+) 11 9 11  8 14 12 
Site Positive Sites Probability 
A 10 of 29 0.655 
B 23 of 31 0.742 
C 23 of 32 0.719 
Overall 65 of 92 0.707 
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4. HEAT RESISTANCE STUDY  
Heat resistance tests were performed to produce a killing curve of 17 strains of B. cereus. 
Killing Curves for 5A (Arnold) and SF-19 (Whimpy) are demonstrated in Appendix E.  
Ten B. cereus strains were obtained from previous studies, three commercial strains, and 
four B. cereus strains obtained from the soil sample studies were tested.  The growth 
patterns of the B. cereus strain were consistent with the previous pasteurization study 
with inhibition of growth occurring at 70°C.  Two strains of B. cereus were selected for 
the transmission studies.  The 5A strain showed healthy growth at 70°C with classic 
colony morphology. (Arnold)  The SF-19 B. cereus strain showed reduced growth at 
70°C, but did exhibited characteristics meeting the B. cereus criteria with diminished 
hemolysis or lecithinase production. (Whimpy) The data of 1:10 dilutions, 1:100 
dilutions, and 1:1000 dilutions are summarized in Tables 6A, B, and C.  
Table 6A.  The Heat Resistance Study of B. cereus Spores – 1:10 Dilution. 
 
Heat Resistance of Bacillus Spores - 1:10  Dilution 
Sample  30°C 40ºC 50°C 60°C 70°C 80°C 90ºC 
B. cereus ATCC 14579 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 10 0 
B. cereus ATCC 13061 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 1 0 
B. cereus ATCC 11778 TNTC TNTC TNTC 2 TNTC 0 0 
30A TNTC TNTC TNTC 10 TNTC 3 1 
5A TNTC TNTC TNTC 4 TNTC 2 0 
18A TNTC TNTC TNTC 2 0 0 0 
27A TNTC TNTC TNTC 1 2 2 0 
LR-16 TNTC TNTC TNTC 20 16 3 1 
SF-10 TNTC TNTC TNTC 3 0 0 0 
LR-15 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 4 4 0 
SF-3 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 5 0 
GF-6 TNTC TNTC TNTC 16 11 12 1 
FMP-44 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 13 5 0 
SF-20 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 24 0 
PF-5 TNTC TNTC TNTC 25 13 9 0 
PF-16A TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 15 10 1 
SF-19 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 13 2 0 
*Numbers represent CFU. 
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Table 6B. The Study of Heat Resistance of B. cereus Spores – 1:100 Dilution. 
 
Heat Resistance of Bacillus Spores - 1:100 Dilution 
Sample 30°C 40°C 50°C 60°C 70°C 80°C 90°C 
B. cereus ATCC 14579 TNTC TNTC TNTC 5 TNTC 4 0 
B. cereus ATCC 11778 TNTC TNTC TNTC 1 TNTC 0 0 
B. cereus ATCC 13061 TNTC TNTC TNTC 4 3 0 0 
30A TNTC TNTC TNTC 6 TNTC 2 0 
27A TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 0 0 
5A TNTC TNTC TNTC 2 TNTC 0 0 
18A TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 0 0 
LR-16 TNTC TNTC TNTC 4 3 0 0 
SF-10 TNTC TNTC TNTC 1 0 0 0 
LR-15 TNTC TNTC TNTC 5 0 0 0 
SF-3 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 
GF-6 TNTC TNTC TNTC 1 1 0 0 
FMP-44 TNTC TNTC TNTC 3 2 1 0 
SF-20 TNTC TNTC TNTC 16 2 2 0 
PF-5 TNTC TNTC TNTC 5 1 0 0 
PF-16A TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 6 0 0 
SF-19 TNTC TNTC TNTC 12 0 0 0 
*Numbers represent CFU. 
 
Table 6C.  The Study of Heat Resistance of B. cereus Spores – 1:1000 Dilution. 
 
Heat Resistance of Bacillus Spores - 1:1000 Dilution.  
Sample 30°C 40°C 50°C 60°C 70°C 80°C 90°C 
B. cereus ATCC 14579 TNTC TNTC TNTC 3 6 1 0 
B. cereus ATCC 11778 TNTC TNTC TNTC 3 13 0 0 
B. cereus ATCC 13061 TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 1 0 0 
30A TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 11 0 0 
27A TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 0 0 
5A TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 9 0 0 
18A TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 0 0 
LR-16 TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 0 0 
SF-10 TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 0 0 
LR-15 TNTC TNTC TNTC 1 0 0 0 
SF-3 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC 5 0 0 
GF-6 TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 4 0 0 
FMP-44 TNTC TNTC TNTC 0 0 0 0 
SF-20 TNTC TNTC TNTC 4 1 0 0 
PF-5 TNTC TNTC TNTC 1 0 0 0 
PF-16A TNTC TNTC TNTC 13 1 0 0 
SF-19 TNTC TNTC TNTC 4 0 0 0 
*Numbers represent CFU. 
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5.  SPORE PREPARATION 
 
The Arnold strain provided 1 colony when diluted 10-10, yielding 1010 CFU’s per gram. 
The Whimpy strain provided 1 colony when diluted 10-8, yielding 108 CFU’s per gram. 
The stock culture for each strain was grown in 3 liters of sporulation media for 72 hours.  
The culture was centrifuged, dried and weighed.  The final weight of the Arnold strain 
was 1.615 grams.  A total of 1.615 X 1010 spores were produced in 3 liters of media after 
72 hours, a short time period. The final weight of the Whimpy strain was 872mg giving a 
total of 8.72 X 1010 spores produced from the culture.  
 
The spore suspension used to simulate transmission contained 106 CFU/spray. A filter 
paper was sprayed with sterile water to obtain the weight of a single aerosol spray from 
the spray bottle.  The mean weight of the aerosol spray was 148mg. A specimen of 
473mg of Arnold spores is needed to make 70ml of spore suspension. A sample of 50mg 
of the Arnold and Whimpy spores were used to make the spores suspension for the 
transmission studies.  For Arnold, the spore suspension contained 1.06 X 107 CFU/spray.  
For Whimpy, the spore suspension contained 1.06 X 106 CFU/spray. These spore 
suspensions were used in the transmission studies involving toothbrushes and doorknobs. 
Calculations are demonstrated in Appendix D.   
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B. TRANSMISSION STUDIES 
1.  INGESTION TRANSMISSION: COFFEE 
Coffee was selected as a model to simulate ingestion transmission of a pathogen via food 
product.  12mg of spores were added directly to the coffee grounds prior to brewing. This 
study utilized the two B. cereus strains; Arnold and Whimpy. B. cereus spores were 
successfully transmitted via brewed coffee. The temperature of the brewed coffee was 
78ºC which is below the threshold limit from the heat resistant studies. The results are 
summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Detection of B. cereus in Coffee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARNOLD 
Serial Dilution 10µl         1µl 
Additive CFU 
Black 9 2 
French Vanilla (International) TNTC 2 
French Vanilla (Coffee Mate) TNTC 2 
Sweet-n-Low 17 2 
Sugar 20 2 
WHIMPY 
Serial Dilution 10µl        1µl 
Additive CFU 
Black 7 2 
Creamer (Half & Half, liquid) 5 2 
Creamer (Cain’s, powder) 3 2 
Sweet-n-Low 7 2 
Sugar 6 2 
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Four types of creamer were tested:  Coffeemate French Vanilla (liquid), International 
Delight French Vanilla (liquid), Lando’Lakes half and half (liquid), Cain’s coffee 
creamer (powder). Initial cultures of the cream were performed to determine extraneous 
microbes present.  These cultures yielded no growth.  A culture of the uninfected coffee 
grounds yielded a colony growth which was subsequently tested using an API test 
system.  This test indicated the presence of a Flavobacterium species.  A recent study of 
B. cereus in coffee samples showed that B. cereus was not detected.   PCR tests were 
performed and amplicons were only found in inoculated coffee samples. (Manzano et al., 
2003).  
   
The Arnold strain was selected because of its full complement of toxins.  A sample of 
12mg was added to the coffee grounds.  The coffee was brewed with 1000ml of sterile 
water.  The coffee was aliquotted into five cups.  Each cup had 2.4 X 107 CFU.  10µl of 
the coffee was plated to BHI agar plates for culture.  Theoretically, a 10µl sampling 
should contain 120 CFU.  The 10µl sampling of black coffee formed 9 colonies.  The 10 
fold loss of colony forming units can be attributed to the brewing process. The coffee 
with the sugar and artificial sugar added demonstrated a higher growth.  This would 
indicate that the sweeteners stimulate germination prior to ingestion.  The coffee with the 
creamer added demonstrated a growth rate TNTC.  This indicates that the creamers 
provide a nutrient rich environment that stimulates germination for B. cereus.   
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The Whimpy strain was selected as an example of a less toxic B. cereus strain. A sample 
of 12mg was added to the coffee grounds. The coffee was brewed with 1000ml of sterile 
water.  The coffee was aliquotted into five cups.  Each cup had 2 X 107CFU/200ml coffee 
x 10µl X 1 ml/1000µl = 100 CFU.  Theoretically, a 10µl sampling should contain 100 
CFU.  The 10µl sampling of black coffee formed 7 colonies. The effects of coffee 
additives with the Whimpy strain were consistent with Arnold.  This indicates that the 
ingestion transmission is less effective for spore transmission when additives are present. 
The inoculation of spores did not change the appearance of the coffee.  The additives to 
the coffee increased the germination rates of the spore but had the appearance of normal 
coffee.  All of the cups of coffee appeared untampered.   
 
2. INGESTION TRASMISSION: TOOTHBRUSH 
Toothbrushes were selected as a model of transmission of a pathogen via personal 
intimate objects.  The toothbrushes were sprayed with a spore suspension to simulate 
transmission with a spore-based bioweapon.  Viable B. cereus spores were recovered 
from all of the inoculated toothbrushes.  All of the cultures showed prominent growth 
from viable spores.  The data is summarized in Table 8.    
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Table 8.  Detection of B. cereus from Toothbrushes. 
 
Detection of B. cereus from Toothbrushes 
Toothbrush 0 Hour  24 Hour 48 Hour 
Sterile Water - + + 
Spore Suspension + + + 
Spore Suspension/Toothpaste + + + 
 
*All positive plates – too numerous to count 
Sterile water at 24 hour < 20 colonies 
*(+) Positive, (-) Negative 
Spore Suspension prepared with 500mg of spores in 70ml sterile water. 
 
The negative control in the study was a toothbrush inoculated with sterile water.  The 
negative control toothbrush was positive when incubated for 24 and 48 hours. The 
toothbrush was stored with the spore inoculated toothbrushes separated by a distance of 
four inches.  The amount of growth was relatively poor – less than 20 colonies.  The 
presence of viable spores in the negative control indicates a small level of transmission 
from the inoculated toothbrushes.  The toothbrushes did not change in appearance when 
inoculated with spores.  The texture of the bristles camouflaged the presence of the 
inoculum.  The toothbrushes appeared untampered.   
 
3. CONTACT/CASUAL TRANSMISSION:  DOORKNOBS 
Doorknobs were selected as the model for transmission of a pathogen via casual objects.  
The doorknobs were sprayed with a spore suspension to simulate contamination with a 
spore-based bioweapon.  B. cereus spores were recovered from all inoculated doorknobs.  
The growth rate at all time intervals indicates that viable spores were present.  The 
prominent growth at the 48-hour interval suggests that spore recovery is not diminished 
over time.  The visual inspection of the doorknobs at the 24-48 hour time intervals 
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revealed a watermark residue.  The watermark residue was more prominent on the 
brushed metal doorknob.   The uneven tones of the brass-plated doorknob decreased the 
visualization of the watermark residue.  The glass doorknob disguised the watermark 
residue with its refractive nature.  The doorknobs appeared untampered.  The data is 
summarized in Table 9.   
 
Table 9.  Detection of B. cereus from Doorknobs. 
 
Detection of B. cereus from Door Knobs 
Door Knobs 0 Hour 24 Hour 48 Hour 
Glass + + + 
Brushed Metal + + + 
Brass-plated + + + 
 
*All colonies were too numerous to count 
(+) Positive
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The current climate of terrorist awareness has led to renewed interest in biological 
warfare defense.  B. anthracis has already been used as a bioweapon.  The phylogenetic 
nature within the Bacillus group allows for B. cereus to be used as a surrogate for B. 
anthracis research.  
 
A total of 96 soil samples were collected along a highway that crossed a significant 
ecological dividing line.  B. cereus strains were isolated and cultured uniformly 
throughout the collection trail. Seventy percent (70%) of the soil samples were positive 
for B. cereus.  The lack of B. cereus in the negative sites can be attributed to the high 
level of diversity of natural flora.  An individual site may contain a plethora of normal 
flora that could retard the growth of B. cereus (von Stetten et al., 1999). This high 
probability implies that if a terrorist collected three dirt samples from a random site, 2 of 
the samples would be positive for B. cereus spores.  This emphasizes the ubiquity of B. 
cereus.  Pasteurization studies reveal a temperature of 70°C as ideal for treating the soil 
samples.  This high temperature eliminates extraneous microbes without inhibiting the 
germinating potential of B. cereus spores.   
 
The events of 2002 renewed interest in biological warfare defense and led to the 
development of Homeland Security.  With anthrax being a known threat, the government 
now scrutinizes known cultures and strains of B. anthracis.  The access to anthrax strains 
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are well documented.  An obvious crack in this surveillance system is the potential of a 
terrorist to obtain isolates from nature.  While colonies exhibiting anthrax characteristics 
were not rigorously definitive, it is easy to perceive that a terrorist could obtain anthrax 
spores from the soil to be grown for use as a bioweapon from an untraceable origin.  
   
The heat resistant studies yielded results consistent with the heat resistant nature of 
spores.  High temperatures (>80°C) are needed to inactivate spore germination. The 
growth patterns of the B. cereus strains were uniform regardless of the strain source.  A 
simple spore culture was grown for 72 hours yielding greater that 108 CFU’s.  The 1979 
Sverdlovsk incident which resulted in a 2 % fatality rate involved the accidental release 
of spores equivalent to the quantity of CFU’s grown from three liters of 72 hour cultures 
(Meselson et al. 1994). Sverdlovsk has a population greater than 1.2 million but the 
release of anthrax spores was on the southeast point of a non-residential area.  The wind 
pattern from the north caused the dispersal of spores to spread in a sparsely populated 
rural area.  Had the wind shifted to the north, the fatality rate would have undoubtedly 
been larger.  Information from the Sverdlovsk outbreak of 1979 is limited as the KGB 
confiscated hospital and public health records of the epidemic.  Detailed information has 
been extrapolated from death records, records of compensated families, grave markers, 
interviews with survivors and victim family members, and interviews with health care 
professionals.  
 
The U.S. Defense Department estimates that the LD50 of anthrax for humans is between 
8,000 and 10,000 spores (U.S. Department of Defense, 1986). The 2% fatality rate of 
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Sverdlovsk was caused by a dose of 9 spores.  This dose would be inhaled by an 
individual breathing 0.03m3/minute. Using a Gaussian plume model, the researchers 
determined that 4 X 109 spores were released at the source site (Meselson et al., 1994).  
 
The estimated amount of anthrax spores accidentally released in Sverdlovsk is equivalent 
to the amount of B. cereus spores used in the 70ml aerosol spray bottle.  A terrorist intent 
on creating a bioweapon could easily stockpile enough Bacillus spores to achieve a LD50 
for a major metropolitan area.  The spores could be obtained from the soil outside of the 
current surveillance focus of the Department of Homeland Security.  
 
Coffee grounds were used as a model for ingestion transmission.  B. cereus spores were 
readily recovered from the coffee after brewing.  The presence of coffee additives yielded 
a higher growth of B. cereus.  This would indicate that the nutrient-rich additives and the 
heat shock are stimulating germination prior to ingestion. If germination occurs prior to 
ingestion, the amount of viable spores is diminished reducing the effectiveness of 
transmission for terrorists.   
 
Visual inspection of coffee grounds did not suggest tampering from an outside source.  A 
terrorist could inoculate the grounds during the manufacturing stage.  The presence of the 
spores would not be visually detected while packaged tampering could be noticeable.  
Minimally processed foods are not typically treated to inactivate bacterial spores.  A 
study of B. cereus spores in milk indicated that treatment with high pressure successfully 
inactived bacterial spores (Opstal et al., 2004). Nisin is added to crumpets, liquid eggs, 
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and other food products to inhibit the growth of gram-positive pathogens such as B. 
cereus; however, this additive does not inactivate spores (Beuchat et al., 1997). The 10µl 
sampling of coffee yielded viable CFU’s.  If an individual swallowed 10ml of the 
infected black coffee, approximately 9,000 viable CFU’s would be consumed with the 
Arnold strain and 70,000 viable CFU’s would be consumed with the Whimpy strain.  The 
target victim would not need to consume the entire cup of coffee in order to achieve the 
LD50 rate. 
 
 An additional ingestion transmission study utilized toothbrushes as a source of infection.  
Successful transmission of viable spores was found.  The presence of toothpaste 
stimulates spore germination prior to ingestion that might reduce transmission 
effectiveness.  Cross-contamination from a contaminated toothbrush to an uninoculated 
toothbrush was performed.  In both transmission studies, the inoculums were not visually 
evident due to the uneven texture of the toothbrushes that tended to mask the presence of 
the spore inoculums.  Visual inspection of the toothbrushes did not suggest tampering 
from an outside source.  The scenario for this study shows the potential for terrorist 
threat, however; the infection of a bioagent on a toothbrush requires access to the 
toothbrush.  A terrorist would need access to the toothbrush prior to packaging, perhaps 
by obtaining a job at a toothbrush manufacturing plant.  An outbreak could cross 
geographic barriers during distribution of the contaminated toothbrushes and the 
subsequent investigation to trace the infectious source would be more difficult.  
Investigation would first need to isolate the source of infection as the toothbrush to be 
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traced back to the supplier.  This scenario gives a new perspective to the concept of 
“untraceable origin.”  
 
 Toothpaste was ineffective in killing Bacillus spores in the transmission studies.  Rather, 
the toothbrushes with the toothpaste (simulating brushing) had more prominent growth 
than toothbrushes without toothpaste.  The bacteria appeared to flourish in the nutrient-
rich toothpaste, indicating the ingredients in toothpaste enhance B. cereus growth. 
Toothpaste does promote spore germination, making the transmission of spores less 
effective.   Studies of toothpaste indicate that triclosan retards the growth of some 
microbial contamination (McGhee, n.d.). While this additive may inhibit some microbial 
growth, it would not inactivate the methodically inert spores.   This would indicate that 
more of the spores would reach the target.  Having a microbial inhibitor may reduce the 
incidence of viral or bacterial outbreaks, but this would not be effective for spore-based 
bioweapons.  
 
A contact transmission study was performed utilizing doorknobs as a source of infection 
transmission.  The Bacillus spores were successfully retrieved from three different 
doorknob surface types.  This model of contamination is ideal for the bioterrorist.  The 
inoculum was not visibly apparent and the source of infection would be difficult to trace. 
Visual inspection of the doorknobs at the 24-48 hour time interval revealed a watermark 
residue.  The watermark residue was more prominent on the brushed metal doorknob.  
The uneven tones of the brass doorknob decreased the visualization of the watermark 
residue.  The glass doorknob disguised the watermark residue with its refractive nature.   
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The 2001 anthrax outbreak was traced to transmission via the United States postal 
service.  Witnesses from the outbreak reported a white powder contaminant. In an 
atmosphere of heightened awareness to bioterrorist activities, individuals reported the 
presence of unusual powder residues.  The Illinois Department of Public Health received 
over a thousand environmental specimens from the Chicago area during the two-month 
period of October and November 2001 (Dworkin & Golash, 2003). The high level of 
public anxiety led to the submission of samples that included powdered doughnuts, a 
telephone, a frozen dinner, and mail items.  It is relevant to note that the “suspicious” 
public looked for a powdery substance.  
 
The public at large does not examine a doorknob when entering a public facility.  This 
study clearly demonstrates the ease of transmission of a bioterrorism agent via 
doorknobs. If a terrorist chose a doorknob in a public facility, the source of the 
contaminant would be difficult to trace.  The victims profile would indicate the source of 
infection to be the restaurant, a department store, or even a church.  Once the location 
was identified by investigators, time would be lost in attempting to rule out the staff and 
all internal items as sources.  The terrorist could infect multiple sites within a target 
facility, making the identification source of infection more difficult.  This infection would 
tend to cross economic barriers and in the case of multiple sites, geographic barriers.  The 
victims would be of varying ages and racial backgrounds.  This transmission would 
encompass cutaneous infection as well as ingestion as most individuals do not wash their 
hands before eating a meal in public.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The focus of national security relies heavily on known sources for bioagents.  This study 
demonstrates the ease of obtaining a bioagent from an undocumented and untraceable 
source such as dirt.  The bioagent could be dispersed covertly, yielding a potentially 
widespread outbreak of disease.  Specifically, the findings of the present studies revealed 
that: 
 
1.  B. cereus could be found in 70% of the soil samples tested.  
2.  The ecological  dividing line that separates the arid west from the temperate east, does   
not affect B. cereus growth.  
3.  B. cereus can be easily grown and sporulated to produce a sufficient quantity of spores 
for bioterrorism use. 
4.  B. cereus can be transmitted by ingestion of foodstuff such as coffee and/or creamers; 
by intimate inanimate objects such as toothbrushes; and by casual contact such as 
doorknobs.   
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
MATERIALS 
 
Standard bulb planter 
 
Sheep blood agar plates (SBA):  SBA is Trypticase® Soy Agar with 5% sheep blood 
(TSA II) (Troy Biologicals Inc., Troy, New York).   
   
Mannitol-egg-yolk-polymyixin agar plates (MYP):  The MYP agar plates were prepared 
in the laboratory using the formulation and procedure as given in the Difco Manuel.   
Formula per Liter: 
Bacto Beef Extract…………………….1 g 
Bacto Peptone………………………...10 g 
Bacto D-Mannitol…………………….10 g 
Sodium Chloride……………………...10 g 
Bacto Phenol Red…………………0.025 g 
Bacto Agar……………………………15 g 
Antimicrobic Vial P: 30,000 units polymixin B 
 
Brain Heart Infusion Broth (BHI) (Acumedia Baltimore MD) 
 
Brain Heart Infusion Agar (BHI) (Acumedia Baltimore MD) 
 
Freezing Media – Brain Heart Infusion Broth (BHI) (Acumedia Baltimore MD) with 10% 
glycerol (Sigma St. Louis, MO). 
 
Sporulation Medium:  Nutrient Agar (NA) (Difco) was supplemented with 0.05 g/liter of 
manganese sulfate (NAMS agar).  (Beuchat et al.) 
 
10,000-units/mL penicillin test discs. BBL™ Sensi-Disc™ Antimicrobial Susceptibility 
Test Disc (Benton Dickson and Co. Sparks MD) 
 
Beckman Avanti J-25 Centrifuge 
 
Lifealizer: Labconco Freeze Dry/System/Freezone 4.5 
 
Coffeemaker: Proctor Silex  
 
Coffee: Maxwell House regular roast grounds Creamer:  French Vanilla Coffeemate, 
French Vanilla International Delight, Half and Half Land Lakes, Cain’s coffee creamer – 
powder. 
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Sugar: S&H sugar, Sweet-n-Low 
 
Toothbrushes: Oral –B, Sulcus  
 
Door Knobs: 2 glass, 2 brushed metal, 2 brass-plated standard house door knobs. 
(Lowe’s) 
 
70 ml spray bottles  
 
Toothpaste - Aim©2004 Church & Dwight Co., Inc., active ingredient – Sodium 
Monofluorophosphate (0.8%). 
 
Gram Stain – Standard 
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APPENDIX B – COLONY MORPHOLOGY 
Colony Morphology for All Site A Isolates 
Site Blood Agar Lecithinase Lipase Spore Form Gram + Penicillin 
A1,1 Dis + + Central/Ellipsoidal + R 
A1,2 Dis  + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
2A Dis  + + Central/ Ellipsoidal + R 
3A No data No data No data No data No data No data 
4A,1 Nh + + Gram negative - R 
4A,2 Dis  + + Spores Absent + S 
4A,3 Nh + + Spores Absent + R 
5A W + + Central /Spherodial + R 
6A,1 Nh + + Terminal / Ellipsoidal + S 
6A,2 Dis  + + Spores Absent + R 
6A,3 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
7A No data No data No data No data No data No data 
8A,1 Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
8A,2 Dis  + + Spores Absent + S 
9A Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
10A,1 Dis  + - Paracentral / Spheroidal + S 
10A,2 Dis  + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
10,3 Dis  + + Central / Ellipsoidal + S 
11A,1 Dis  + - Central /Spheroidal  + No tablet 
11A,2 Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + No tablet 
11A,3 Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + No tablet 
12A,1 Nh + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
12A,2 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
12A,3 Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
13A,1 W + + No data + R 
13A,2 W + + Spores Absent + R 
13A,3 W + + Gram negative + No data 
14A,1 W + + Spores Absent + R 
14A,2 W + + Gram negative - R 
14A,3 W + + Gram negative - R 
15A,1 W + - Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
15A,2 Nh + - No data + R 
16A,1 Nh + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
16A,2 Nh + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
16A,3 Dis  + - Central /Spheroidal  + S 
17A,1 Nh + + Spores Absent + R 
17A,2 Nh + + Gram negative - R 
17A,3 Nh + + Gram negative - R 
18A,1 W + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
18A,2 W + + Gram negative - R 
19A,1 Nh + + Spores Absent + S 
19A,2 Nh + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
19A,3 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
20A,1 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
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20A,2 W + - Gram negative - S 
20A,3 W + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
20A,4 Nh + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
21A,1 Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
21A,2 Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
21A,3 W + + Gram negative + R 
22A,1 Dis  + + Paracentral / Spheroidal + S 
22A,2 Nh + - Central and Spheroidal  + R 
22A,3 Nh + - Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
23A,1 No growth + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + No growth 
23A,2 Nh + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
24A,1 Dis  + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
24A,2 Nh + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
24A,3 Nh + + Terminal /Spheroidal + S 
25A,1 Dis  + + Terminal /Spheroidal + S 
25A,2 Nh + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
25A,3 Nh + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
26A,1 Nh + + Terminal/Spheroidal + R 
26A,2 Nh + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
27A,1 Nh + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
27A,2 Dis  + + Central / Ellipsoidal + S 
27A,3 Nh + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
27A,4 Nh + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
28A,1 Nh + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
28A,2 Nh + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
28A,3 Nh + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
28A,4 No growth + + No data No data No growth 
29A,1 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
29A,2 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
30A,1 Dis  + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
30A,2 Nh + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
30A,3 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
31A,1 W + + Central /Spheroidal  + S 
31A,2 Nh + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
31A,3 Dis  + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
32A,1 Dis  + - Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
32A,2 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
32A,3 Dis  + + Central /Spheroidal  + R 
*Dis(Discontinuous)  *W(Weak hemolytic) *Nh(Non-hemolytic)   *R( Resistant)  *S(Non-resistant) 
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Colony Morphology for All Site B Isolates 
Site Blood Agar Lecithinase Lipase Spore Form Gram + Penicillin 
1B,1 Dis + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
1B,2 Dis + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
1B,3 Nh + + Central / Ellipsoidal + S 
2B,1 Dis + + Central / Ellipsoidal + S 
2B,2 Dis + + Spores Absent + S 
3B No data No data No data No data No data No data 
4B,1 Nh + + Spores Absent + S 
4B,2 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
5B,1 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
5B,2 Dis + + No data No data  
6B,1 Dis + + Spores Absent + S 
6B,2 Dis + + Central / Spheroidal + S 
6B,3 Dis + + Terminal / Ellipsoidal + S 
7B,1 Dis + - No data No data R 
7B,2 Dis + + No data No data R 
8B,1 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
8B,2 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
9B,1 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
9B,2 Dis + + Terminal / Ellipsoidal + S 
10B,1 Dis + + Spores Absent + R 
10B,2 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
11B,1 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
11B,2 Dis + + Spores Absent + S 
12B,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
12B,2 W + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
12B,3 W + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
13B,1 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
13B,2 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
13B,3 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
14B,1 W + + Too small to visualize + S 
14B,2 W + + Spores Absent + S 
14B,3 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
15B,1 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
15B,2 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
15B,3 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
16B,1 W + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
16B,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
16B,3 W + - Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
17B,1 W + + Spores Absent + S 
17B,2 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
17B,3 W + + Spores Absent + S 
18B,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
18B,2 W + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
18B,3 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
19B,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
19B,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
20B,1 W + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
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20B,2 W + + Central and Ellipsoidal + S 
20B,3 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
21B,1 W + + Spores Absent + S 
21B,2 W + + Spores Absent + S 
22B,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
22B,2 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
22B,3 Dis + + Spores Absent + S 
23B,1 Dis + + Central / Spheroidal + R 
23B,2 W + + Spores Absent + S 
23B,3 W + + Terminal /Spheroidal + S 
24B,1 Dis + + Spores Absent + R 
24B,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
25B,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
25B,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
26B Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
27B,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
27B,2 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
28B,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
28B,2 W + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
29B,1 W + + Spores Absent + S 
29B,2 Dis + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + R 
30B,1 W + + Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
30B,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
31B,1 W + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
31B,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
32B,1 W + + Paracentral/ Spheroidal + S 
32B,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
*Dis(Discontinuous)  *W(Weak hemolytic)  *Nh(Non-hemolytic) *R(Resistant)  *S(Non-resistant) 
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Colony Morphology for All Site C Isolates 
Site Blood Agar Lecithinase Lipase Spore Form Gram + Penicillin 
1C,1 Dis + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
1C,2 No growth + - No data No data No growth 
2C,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
2C,2 Dis + + Spores absent + R 
3C,1 Dis + + Central / Ellipsoidal + No data 
3C,2 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + No data 
3C,3 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + No data 
4C,1 Dis + + Spores absent + S 
4C,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
4C,3 Dis + + Spores absent + S 
5C.1 Dis + - No data No data S 
5C,2 Dis + - No data No data S 
6C,1 W + + Spores absent + S 
6C,2 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + S 
6C,3 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
7C,1 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + S 
7C,2 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
7C,3 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
8C,1 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + S 
8C,2 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + S 
9C Dis + + Spores absent + R 
10C,1 Dis + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
10C,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
11C,1 Dis + + Spores absent + S 
11C,2 Dis + + Spores absent + S 
12C,1 Dis + - No data No data S 
12C,2 W + - Gram negative - S 
13C,1 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + S 
13C,2 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
13C,3 Dis + + Gram negative - R 
14C,1 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
14C,2 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
14C,3 Dis + - Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
15C Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
16C,1 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
16C,2 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
17C,1 Dis + - Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
17C,2 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + S 
17C,3 Nh + + Central /Shperoidal + S 
18C Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
19C Nh + - Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + S 
20C,1 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
20C,2 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
21C,1 Nh + - Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
21C,2 W + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + S 
22C,1 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + S 
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22C,2 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
22C,3 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
22C,4 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
23C,1 Dis + + No data No data S 
23C,2 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + S 
23C,3 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
23C,4 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
24C,1 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + S 
24C,2 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
24C,3 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
25C,1 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + R 
25C,2 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
25C,3 Dis + + Terminal/ Ellipsoidal + R 
26C,1 W + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
26C,2 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
26C,3 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + R 
27C,1 Dis + + No data No data S 
27C,2 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + S 
28C,1 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + S 
28C,2 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
28C,3 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
29C,1 Dis + + Paracentral / Ellipsoidal + S 
29C,2 Dis + + Spores absent + S 
30C,1 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
30C,2 Dis + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
31C,1 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
31C,2 W + + Paracentral /Spheroidal + R 
32C,1 Dis + + Terminal /Spheroidal + S 
32C,2 Dis + + Central /Shperoidal + R 
32C,3 Dis + + Central / Ellipsoidal + R 
*Dis(Discontinuous)  *W(Weak hemolytic)  *Nh(Non-hemolytic)  *R(Resistant)  *S(Non-resistant) 
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APPENDIX C – SOIL SITES AND SOL SAMPLES 
Site 1 and Soil Samples.   
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Site 2 and Soil Samples 
 
 
 
 
 66 
Site 3 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 4 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 5 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 6 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 7 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 8 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 9 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 10 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 11 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 12 and Soil Samples. 
 
 76 
Site 13 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 14 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 15 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 16 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 17 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 18 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 19 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 20 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 21 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 22 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 23 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 24 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 25 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 26 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 27 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 28 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 29 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 30 and Soil Samples.  
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Site 31 and Soil Samples. 
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Site 32 and Soil Samples. 
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APPENDIX D – CALCULATIONS 
 
Spore Preparation for Arnold 
1 colony resulted at a dilution of 10-10 
 
1g of spore into 10ml = 10-3grams 
             1ml 
 
Arnold spore powder weighed 1.615 grams 
 
10-10 grams/ml = 1 gram/ml              
     1 colony           x colonies 
 
x =   1     =    10-10 CFU 
      10-10                 1 gram 
 
Spray Preparation  
Theory 
 
Spray weight = 0.148 grams        density of H20 = 1 gram 
                                                                                   ml 
 
70ml spray bottle          70ml = 472.973 sprays 
                                      0.148           bottle 
 
Infectious rate = 106CFU             106CFU   =   CFU = ~0.05 grams 
                             Spray                  0.148 ml         70ml  
 
Experiment 
0.05 grams added to 70ml of sterile water in spray bottle 
 
0.05grams x   1010CFU   x    1      x   0.148ml = 1.06 x 107CFU 
                        1 gram         70ml                               1 spray 
 
 
Coffee Experiment 
0.012 grams to make 1000ml of coffee 
aliquot to 5 cups, ~ 200ml/cup 
 
0.012 = 0.0024 grams   
    5             cup 
 
0.0024 grams x 1010CFU = 2.4 x 107CFU = 2.4 x 107 = xCFU = 120CFU 
     1 cup                gram             1 cup               200ml        10µl
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  Killing Curve for Specimen 5A
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Killing Curve for Specimen SF-19
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